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Abstract: The concept of corruption, in any of
its manifestations, has been extensively researched
and investigated throughout the course of history.  In
this study, in addition to exploring its complex and
dynamic nature, a broad analysis has been attempted
through a literature review which focuses on the pro-
cesses of globalization of labour and other economic
aspects within the transnational textile sector.  Today,
many global industrial developments are centred
around corrupt, but legal processes and asymmetry in
the regulations which control them.  These circums-
tances must be deconstructed and placed at the ser-
vice of the community in order to allow both a better
analysis, as well as a critical understanding of the pro-
cesses which lie behind them.  At the same time, these
processes have consequences and effects on many le-
vels which are also explored and analysed in this study.
Keywords: Corruption, Corporate_Social_Res-
ponsibility, Globalization, Textile_Industry, Ethics.
Resumen: El concepto de corrupción, en cual-
quiera de sus dimensiones, tiene una amplia tradición
dentro de la investigación a lo largo de la historia. En
este caso, además de incorporar el carácter complejo y
dinámico del mismo, se ha generado un amplio análi-
sis que incorpora una revisión de la literatura enfocada
en los procesos de mundialización económica y labo-
ral dentro del sector textil transnacional. Hoy día, mu-
chos de los desarrollos industriales de carácter global
pivotan sobre procesos de corrupción –legalizada– y
asimetrías normativas. Esas circunstancias deben ser
recodificadas y puestas al servicio de la comunidad
para generar un mayor análisis, así como una com-
prensión crítica de los procesos que la generan, te-
niendo presentes las consecuencias multidimensiona-
les de sus efectos.
Palabras clave: Corrupción, Responsabilidad
Social Empresarial, Mundialización, Industria Textil,
Ética.
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INTRODUCTION
The study of the concept of corruption, together with all of the related
processes which revolve around it, have taken on great importance recently.
As a result, there is currently a need to engage in a critical exploration of all as-
pects of this concept by means of an ontological, epistemological and axiolo-
gical analysis. Jain indicates that “although it may seem a question of seman-
tics, the definition of corruption will determine what is to be modelled and
what is to be measured” 1. Corruption is as ancient as humanity itself, al-
though it has perhaps never had such importance in the lives of individuals,
nations and their surroundings as it has nowadays. The existing inequality on
a global scale, together with the large number of transactions of an economic
nature, as well as of other interests, which take place around the world without
let or hindrance (though not to the same degree for everyone), should be tho-
roughly analysed from a multidimensional perspective.
The existence of a dysfunctional society is generally accepted, in which
some members have all of their needs met, or indeed exceeded, by transna-
tional (TN) textile companies, while others, prepared to do anything in order
to survive, are subjugated to the so-called first world economies and form a
kind of shadow-world. Meanwhile, the weakest members are excluded2 as a
result of this inequality and the established, often illegal, processes of corrup-
tion. This underground world does whatever is necessary to achieve its ob-
jectives, including the encouragement of inequalities and asymmetries and the
pursuit of maximum profits. The processes of corruption are supported by
judicial systems which are designed precisely so as to rule in favour of those si-
tuations which allow personal enrichment. These circumstances are neces-
sary in order to keep the West supplied with its weekly demand for new clo-
thes3 at a minimal cost, sourced from remote locations with scant labour laws.
In response to this inequality, the TN textile companies carry out, on an ad
hoc basis, supposedly philanthropic or corporate socially responsible (CSR) ac-
tivities, none of which are examples of truly ethical conduct. In many cases
in fact, these simply mask a pernicious and reprehensible behaviour which fur-
ther conforms to the concept of corruption as analysed here4.
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1 Jain, A. K. (2001), pp. 71-120.
2 Sassen, S. (2015).
3 Luque, A. (2017).
4 Becker, G. & Stigler, G. J. (1974); Buscaglia, E. (1999); del Castillo, A. (2001) and (2003); Azpur, J.
& Ballón, E. (2006); Hodgson, G. M. & Jiang, S. (2008); Calvo, J. A.; Alvarez, I. & Garayar, A.
(2011); Villoria, M. & Jiménez, F. (2012).
One interpretation of the word corruption is defined as “the illegitimate
use of public power for private gain” , or as5 “all illegal and unethical use of
governmental activity as a result of personal or political gain”6. Montaner sta-
tes that corruption in Latin America is expressed in at least three ways: 1) clas-
sic corruption, which consists in receiving commissions or bribes for each con-
tract awarded, or each regulation which is broken to someone’s advantage, 2)
indirect corruption, which is permitted in order to benefit an allied party, 3)
patronage, which involves the use of public money to purchase a wide base of
support through sinecures and unjustifiable privileges7.
Heidenheimer separates corruption into three types: that which is based
on public office: “behaviour which diverges from the normal functions of ci-
vil service as a result of private interests (motivated by family or friends), pe-
cuniary interests, or for reasons of status”; that which is based on the market
and defined as “business, the income of which will be maximised by breaking
those laws and regulations designed to prevent private gain and influence”;
and that which is based on issues of public and common interest 8. As stated
by Flores: “corruption is not necessary, or indeed even desirable, from an eco-
nomic point of view; but it may become an effective and systematic mecha-
nism for personal enrichment and the acquisition of additional benefits for
both companies and the individuals involved”9. As indicated by the etymo-
logy of the word corruption, the breadth of its significance and the extent of
its reach may be clearly perceived.
I. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Bertolt Brecht10, in his play about Julius Caesar, wrote “the governors’
clothes consisted entirely of pockets”. Tondini states that “in 1529, one may
point to the first clear link between crime and money. King Francis I of
France, having paid 12 million escudos for the ransom of his children who were
being held captive in Spain, was forced to wait 4 months while the hostage-
takers counted the money and checked its authenticity, leading to their rejec-
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5 Nas, T. F.; Price, A. C., &Weber, C. T. (1986), p. 108.
6 Benson, G. C. S.; Maaranen, S. A., & Heslop, A. (1978), p. 8.
7 Montaner (2005), pp. 30-36.
8 Heidenheimer, A. J. (1989), p. 166.
9 Flores, G. (2015).
10 Brecht, B (2016), p. 28.
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ting 40,000 on the grounds that it did not meet their requirements”11. Other
authors12 see the origins of corruption even further in the past, in the reign of
Rameses IX, c.1100 BCE, when a certain Peser, a former civil servant to the
pharaoh, officially denounced the illicit business interests of a fellow civil ser-
vant who was associated with a band of tomb-robbers.
Today, it is enough simply to open any daily newspaper in order to con-
template the shameless and unhindered behaviour of human beings. Accor-
ding to Bannenberg and Chaupensteiner13, corruption in Germany may not
be separated from the processes of globalization; a sentiment echoed by Bu-
lard14, who claims that: “In China […] corruption is a national sport, despite
president Xi Jinping’s campaign […]”. Among many illicit and irresponsible
conducts, the stand-out practices are money-laundering, fraudulent conve-
yance, embezzlement, mafia activity, bribery of civil servants, business inte-
rests and government corruption, in which the bankrolling of political parties
with private capital has left them open to blackmail on a grand scale15, which
in turn allows further control.
The concept of corporate corruption, according to Spinellis16, may be
understood as the degeneration of the principles which underpin society, or
more precisely, as the misuse of civil servants and resources, both public and
private, for personal gain. In other words, corruption is a general way of pro-
ceeding in corporate transactions in which secretive exchanges are made with
a view to obtaining an undeclared benefit in return, thereby conferring con-
siderable power on those involved through their habits and customs. By me-
ans of the development of corrupt processes, individuals and companies which
hold power (political, economic, administrative and social) gain some kind of
illicit benefit. The illegality of such benefits, as Kaufmann17 states, is deter-
mined by the values and culture of the society in which the corrupt process
takes place, since that which is considered corrupt in one country, may be ac-
ceptable in another. These circumstances are sometimes trivialised in con-
texts in which more pressing preocupations are present (murder, state or cor-
porate repression, epidemics, natural disasters, o simply the daily struggle to
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11 Tondini, B. M. (2009), p. 6.
12 González, L. (2011), p. 380.
13 Bannenberg, B. & Chaupensteiner, W. (2004).
14 Bulard, M. (2015), p. 9.
15 Vidal-Beneyto, J. (2006); Stiglitz, J. (2006); Argullol, R. (2006).
16 Spinellis, D. (1995).
17 Kaufmann, D. (1997), pp. 114-131.
subsist). This leads to the question: is it legitimate to scrutinise and pass jud-
gement on developing countries using the rather different norms and ethical
or environmental standards of the West?
In regard to the environment, the European Commission18 describes the
textile industry as one of the greatest polluters in the world. This sector uses
large quantities of water resources, produces vast volumes of waste, and con-
taminates in a most visible and palpable way19, resulting in dire consequences
for both the envirnoment and people20. According to the United Nations
Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE):
“The fashion or apparel industry has an often underestimated impact on
the development of our planet. This $2.5 trillion-dollar industry is the
second highest user of water worldwide, producing 20 percent of global
water waste. The production of one cotton shirt requires 2700 Litres –
the amount a person drinks in 2.5 years. 10 percent of the global carbon
emissions are emitted by the apparel industry and cotton farming is res-
ponsible for 24 percent of insecticides and 11 percent of pesticides des-
pite using only 3 percent of the world’s arable land” 21.
Parallel to this, the road is paved for the appearance of all manner of co-
rrupt processes and regulatory abuses running from made-to-measure legis-
lation customised to the requirements of TN textile corporations22, to the un-
reasonable and incongruous injunction imposed on the scientific community
requiring them to accept as valid a large number of the studies presented by
the industry. It is irrational to propose that a public research group make con-
tinual verification of their results in the knowledge that they lack the means to
do so. Such groups will never have the same resources at their disposal as
those of the industry which, further to this, is often not prepared to accept
scientific results that differ from its own analysis, demanding further tests be
carried out. Such requirements are almost impossible to fulfil for the scienti-
fic community, not for lack of will, but due to insufficient means.
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18 European Commission (2013).
19 Pinheiro, H. M, Touraud, E., & Thomas, O. (2004) and Kant, (2012).
20 Chen, H., & Burns, L. (2006); Gallezot, P. (2012); Oliveira, G., Zanoni, M., Palma, D., Cardoso, J.,
Ferraz, E., & Chequer, F. (2013).
21 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), (2018).
22 “As no limits have been set for the concentration of NP/NPE in imported textiles, these substances
may occur in clothing and textile products imported from countries outside the EU where there are
no limits on the use of NPE and NP in the manufacturing process”. Text produced by the Danish En-
vironmental Protection Agency, (2013), p.49.
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Behind these tactics lies the true motive of the industry’s interests: the
defence of their dividends. Scientific ideas and projects which might preju-
dice these interests, exposing dangers, are silenced, even when this may put
lives at risk23. Those researchers who dare investigate or publish on this sub-
ject may suffer reprisals and denigration by the industry or by scientists lin-
ked to government projects. On occasion the textile sector, in order to con-
tinue with its output, resorts to ‘scientific studies’ which corroborate the
harmlessness of their products. According to Rodríguez-Farré & López, cor-
porations exercise power by:
“[…] recruiting scientists (scientists?) to publish articles (generally not
subject to peer review by fellow researchers) in which are questioned the
facts, proofs and arguments recognised by the great majority of the scien-
tific community, and by allowing the repeated intervention of ‘experts’
in informing—and of course, in poisoning—public opinion with a view
to sowing doubt and confusion among sectors […]”24.
States and TNCs ought to contribute to the reduction in the effects of
climate change, as well as move toward a more ethical, sustainable and less co-
rrupt kind of production. It is worth asking if, or indeed when, all countries
should involve themselves in resolving such a quandary. Would it be justifia-
ble to level disproportionate condemnation at states such as China or India
(the principal textile producers in the world) for their high levels of pollution
on the basis of a snapshot of their activity taken from afar, but not to condemn
other countries which took advantage of sudden industrial expansion, couched
in a view of a ‘resource-rich’ world, to produce unlimited pollution and use
semi-slave labour? Many current problems faced by the textile sector come
from a historical past, such as the colonial era. These processes, in confor-
mity with the power-relations which are established during conquests, leave
unpleasant traces. Beyond simply now being autonomous or independent te-
rritories, many still conserve the language of the conqueror, ties of kinship
and economic interests, all of which are used by certain groups to obtain com-
mercial advantage over their competitors by imposing trade barriers and le-
gitimising processes of risk-externalisation, including corruption, towards ri-
vals.
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23 Johns, D. M., & Oppenheimer, G. M. (2018).
24 Rodríguez-Farré & López, (2016), p. 1.
Low standards in social and working practices prevail (e.g. India, Ban-
gladesh, Morocco, Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, Eastern Europe, Turkey,
etc.) together with governing elites, often composed of a single clan, infested
with private interests and far removed from any kind of rational ethical or de-
mocratic process. The multinational corporations of centralised economies
suggest, and even impose, customised legislation; peripheral or semi-peri-
pheral states are placed under pressure by leading countries to not institute
certain kinds of legislation unfavourable to their multinationals. Here indeed
is an international economic infrastructure in which the greater part of the
world’s countries occupies a politically and economically subordinate position
of long historical pedigree, and which has come to be known as ‘neo-colonia-
lism’, with all its consequences.
It is necessary to not to pass generalised judgements on, and not to expect
the same of, one country or another when these may not have the same me-
ans, nor obtain the same profits. One should take into account the nuances
of each situation, as indicated by Carroll & Buchholtz25. Roberto Toscano,
professor and the former Italian ambassador to India and Iran, when asked if
it is necessary to adopt corrupt practices in order to produce competitively
and on a level playing field in certain apparel-producing countries (Asia, Bra-
zil, Morocco, Eastern Europe and Africa) stated: “Yes. One would have to at-
tack corruption, the true unifying element of all political systems, from Me-
xico to China, passing through Europe. Vaste programme!” 26.
In response to the processes of corruption, other authors27 have develo-
ped a vision based on acts of social benefit, holding to the tenet that “good
ethics is good business”28. Such a circumstance per se is insufficient, conside-
ring that, in general terms, the TNCs impose on their textile workshops the
obligation to subscribe to ethical principles, codes of conduct, methods of pro-
duction management, etc., while at the same time the processes of corruption
continue to escalate. The containment of corruption is achieved not simply
through changes in legislation (employment, commercial, criminal or envi-
ronmental law) but rather by putting in place real measures, such as a staunch
defence against all manner of abuses against persons, living things and eco-
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25 Carroll, A. B. & Buchholtz, A. K. (2014), p. 293.
26 Toscano, R. (2015).
27 Pettijohn, C.; Pettijohn, L. &Taylor, A.J. (2008); Cialdini, R. B.; Petrova, P. K.; Goldstein, N. J. (2004);
Ferrell, O. C.; Fraedrich, J. & Ferrell, L. (2014).
28 Kraft, K. L. & Jauch, L. R. (1992).
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systems, providing legal aid etc., as well as the use of other social, institutio-
nal and spiritual agents in order to observe and verify the processes. Such ob-
servers might be trade unions, the International Labour Organisation (ILO)
or any religious organization with moral authority, providing they command
the ability to coordinate on a transnational level.
One palliative measure has been to compile the most ethical corporations
internationally into lists, such as Ethisphere or Transparency International. Ho-
wever, these lists do not record whether any of the businesses’ shareholders
or benefactors have been sanctioned in any of the countries in which they are
active, or whether these have been barred from operating commercially or in-
deed if they have been the subject of any kind of judicial process. For the code
of conduct of all TNCs to promote true transparency, it ought to record the
totality of the suppliers, sub-contractors, affiliates etc. It is important to high-
light that the process of drawing up indices of corruption is based on ‘per-
ceptions’, rather than real scientific studies which use reliable methodologies
that may be universally accepted by all parties and countries29.
Furthermore, Transparency International has adopted the practice of not
‘naming and shaming’ individual corporations, but only the state involved.
This circumstance is of vital importance in understanding the modus operandi,
as TN textile companies may often deliberately be structured so as not to be
identified with any particular nation, which can lead to strategically and poli-
tically erroneous decisions being taken, based on misleading information, in
regard to investment in one country or another. There is even the possibility
that a corporation may identify itself with a state that is known for its trans-
parency, but precisely in order to be the least transparent possible30.
Demonstrating ethical behaviour does not guarantee success in business
per se, but it may lay solid foundations on which to build projects, especially if
it is not used cynically and deliberately as an instrument, dressed up as an
example of CSR of great impact. Corporate corruption is inherent to the very
development of any activity which engenders interests. Such activity can be
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29 The process of selection of experts, with the purpose of making identical analyses, has not been stan-
dardised across all countries. The selection may sometimes draw on experts recognised nationally, lo-
cal entrepreneurs, company executives, etc., according to Transparency International’s Corruption per-
ceptions index 2016: full source description. Furthermore, there is no indication of how to measure
the level of corruption in a country when abuses by public officials for private gain are carried out in the
shadows, and off the record.
30 Abramovici, P. (2000).
attributed to individuals as both originator and author, and their actions and
omissions interact in a way that may be considered personally motivated (these
are human actions and therefore subject to ethics), unjust and disloyal. It is
necessary to distinguish between cases where the corporation is the direct or
indirect beneficiary, and those where an employee or director stands to gain,
typically by using their position to make purchases at inflated prices, resulting
in unnecessary costs which harm the economic and social aspects of their com-
pany or a third party, as well as damaging its image and reputation.
Corruption may occur when the regulations and parameters are drawn
up for the safe limits of exposure to certain dangerous chemicals necessary to
the process of clothes manufacturing; thus, according to de Prada “[…] many
of the exposure limits that are set take into account, more than anything else,
studies carried out, or paid for by the very industry concerned” 31. This situa-
tion generates legalised, yet largely unreported inequality, which may be cha-
racterised as corruption, since having regulations drafted-to-order by the in-
dustry is a corrupt practice, especially when scientific studies32, such as those
by Luongo33 or Browne34 are deliberately put aside, or when certain industry
standards are used which poorly-funded universities and NGOs will find dif-
ficult to monitor. In Horel’s view “the science of regulation [of the maximum
safe limits of exposure—albeit inadvertant—to chemical circumstances] is of
necessity tainted with national policies and laws, and therefore with ideology
in its broad sense. There is subjectivity in all assessment”35.
In Table 1 we can observe how in many countries there is an existing co-
rrelation between low minimum legal wages, precarious employment condi-
tions and a high incidence of corruption, with these same countries being also
the greatest exporters, proportionately, of clothes and apparel worldwide. TN
textile companies exploit, and indeed help create, the weakest countries, and
even to failed states rife with violence, which have the fewest civil and em-
ployment rights36. According to the forecasts of the World Bank35, by 2030
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31 de Prada, C. (2015).
32 Report 6/14 of KEMI, the Swedish chemicals agency, entitled “Chemicals in textiles. Risks to human
health and the environment” states that 10% of residual substances found in textile garments may
be considered a risk to health. At the same time, 5% of these products are potentially harmful to the
environment.
33 Luongo, G. (2015).
34 Browne, M. A. (2015).
35 Horel, S. (2015).
36 Luque, A.; Hernández Zubizarreta, J. & de Pablos, C. (2016b).
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between 43 and 60 percent of the world’s population defined as poor will live
in countries affected by fragility, conflict and violence. This situation must
be evaluated by both TNCs and other supranational bodies.
Considering these determinants, and without engaging in a retrospec-
tive analysis, such as that of Garriga & Melé38, or of Carroll39, the strategies
sometimes applied to combat corruption are not completely efficient at iden-
tifying, isolating and definitively eliminating these processes. Volatility of em-
ployment and of the economy facilitated by chiefly technological end econo-
mic instruments at the service of corruption, and political moneterisation in a
cash-orientated society, are interwoven both in corporations and in society at
large. These strategies are ephemeral in their reach but are multi-reproduci-
ble in time, and they are the leitmotif of an individualised society, oritentated
toward maximised production, often dressed-up as eco-social. Therefore, it is
worth articulating and putting into practice those procedures able to encap-
sulate the vast number of theories related to this issue, from the classical pers-
pectives which highlight the importance of all aspects of interest, such as those
of Hillman & Keim40, and Prahalad & Hammond41, to those of Abrams42 and
Sacconi43, which place an emphasis on the ethical and the social.
It is necessary to keep in mind the impossibility of talking about an effi-
cacious and trustworthy roll-out of CSR policies in countries in which the ma-
jority of ILO conventions have not been ratified (including the most basic),
and where there are no existing resources for effective monitoring and chec-
king that is both independent and proportionate to the benefit obtained by
the TNC, or where regulation has been substituted by mere voluntary agre-
ements. For these reasons, more solid and universal employment legislation
must be established, together with trustworthy monitoring instruments, free
of private interest and much less short-termist. Thousands of subordinate tex-
tile workshops are at the service of TNCs. These ensure they are fullf certi-
fied, and are even subject to the obligation of subsrcibing to ‘first-world’ co-
des of conduct, despite being part of a globalised society at the service of
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37 The 2018 Fragility Forum: Managing Risks for Peace and Stability. A través del Banco Mundial
22/02/2018.
38 Garriga, E. & Melé, D. (2004).
39 Carroll, A. B. (2006).
40 Hillman, A. J. & Keim, G. D. (2001).
41 Prahalad, C. & Hammond, A. (2002).
42 Abrams, F. W. (1951).
43 Sacconi, L. (2005).
production and removed from the centres of transnational corporate decision-
making44. As an example, in India, micro, small and medium enterprises
(MSMES) account for at least 45% of industrial production, 40% of exports,
42 million job opportunities45 and 8000 quality products which are manufac-
tured for local and global markets, all while maintaining a high incidence of
informality. Such an aspect is far-removed from the processes of CSR so
vaunted by TNCs, who rather oppose, in an almost fratricidal way, any re-
cognition of responsibility and liability throughout their supply chains. This
has become one of the principal points of depature for corruption in the trans-
national textile sector, and an example of unprecedent regulatory abuse.
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44 Luque, A.; Hernández Zubizarreta, J. & de Pablos C. (2017b).
45 Mathiyazhagan, K., Govindan, K., NoorulHaq, A. & Geng, Y. (2013).
REVISTA EMPRESA Y HUMANISMO / VOL XXI / Nº 2 / 2018 / 123-184134
ARTURO LUQUE GONZÁLEZ
India 135.73 76.7% 18,354,700
Bangladesh9 139.80 78.8% 1,531,300
Nepal10 59  69.4% 234,600
Pakistan 142.82 60.9% 2,134,900
China 751.99 44.9% 3,388,400
Thailand 382.70 55.1% 425,500
Vietnam 188.64 61.3% 139,300
Cambodia 160.50 62.3% 256,800
Myanmar11 2.75 día 69.9% 515,100
Indonesia 165.54 60.1% 736,100
Sri Lanka12 270 41.7% 45,900
Turkey13 499,85  29.9% 480,300
Marocco14 255 49.7% 219,700
Honduras 278.57 53.1% 23,800
Guatemala 291.68 52.0% 138,100
El Salvador 298 40.2% 18,100
Colombia15 781.24 47.7% 308,200
Table 1:  POVERTY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND TEXTILE-PRODUCING COUNTRIES
Minimum wage1
(in US dollars.)
Vulnerable 
employment2
People in a condi-
tion of modern 
slavery3
Source compiled by author from: 
1) ILO World Wage report 2016/2017a (with all currencies converted to US dollars), 
2) ILO World Employment and Social Outlook Trends 2016b 
3) The Global Slavery Index 2016, 
4) ILO, January 2017 Convention Ratification tool 
5) Transparency International 2017, 
6) Reporters Without Borders 2017, 
7) WTO International Trade Statistics 2015,
8) OXFAM International: The state of Human Rights in the world (indicating human rights violations, such as
torture, lack of freedom of expression, of assembly and of movement, the death penalty, etc.) 15/06/2015, 
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47 (6/8) 79 137 17.742 8
35 (7/8) 145 146 24.584 6
11 (7/8) 131 100 - 4
36 (8/8) 116 139 4.991 7
26 (4/8) 79 176 186.607 9
17 (5/8) 101 142 4.129 5
21 (5/8) 113 175 19.544 4
13 (8/8) 156 132 5.869 4
23 (3/8) 136 131 986 6
19 (8/8) 90 124 7.670 7
43 (8/8) 95 141 4.919 6
59 (8/8) 75 155 16.680 7
62 (7/8) 90 133 3.278 7
26 (8/8) 123 140 3.182 4
73 (8/8) 136 118 1.325 4
30 (8/8) 95 62 2.076 3
61 (8/8) 90 129 546 6
Total 
ratification 
of ILO 
conventions4
Country rank
for “perception
of corruption”5
(176 countries)
Country rank
for freedom of
the press 6
(out of 180
countries)
Exports of ap-
parel in 20147
(millions of US
dollars.)
Human Rights
violations per
country8
9) Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS) p. 27 Consumer Price Index (CPI), Inflation Rate and Wage Rate In-
dex (WRI), 
10) Government of Nepal Labour Act, 1992 (2048), 
11) Business & Human Rights Resource Centre Myanmar, 
12) Parliament of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka: Budgetary Relief Allowance of Workers Act,
no. 4 of 2016,
13) Turkish Labour and Social Security 2017, 
14) Ministère de l’Emploi du Maroc (2015) 
15) Ministry of Labor of Colombia 2017, Decree 2269 30/12/2017.
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The interest of certain managers (fortunately, not common to all) in ma-
ximising profits through the personal and spurious use of all manner of legal,
employment and mercantile acrobatics engenders great harm to both pro-
perty, as indicated by Erturk, Froud, Johal & Williams46, and to the environ-
ment. This situation has resulted in a two-speed society and enterprise in
which the managing directors of TNCs are able to generate more and more
profit (for themselves and others), often to the detriment of third parties who
lack the same degree of manoeverability and find themselves on a financial
cliff-edge47.
According to Braithewaite, corruption brings power to politicians and
administators “who
in general will put self-interest ahead of the public interest, and transna-
tional corporation interest ahead of national interest”48. A clear ideological
bias is established using various parameters to ‘measure’ corruption, and in-
deed to proceed to its eradication. The private sector is seen as possessing
calm, analysis, rigour, freedom and ethics, all of which is under attack from
public administration, which is placed under constant scrutiny and criticism.
All things public are degraded and labelled the antithesis of liberty. It is for-
gotten, it might be said, that thanks to the creation and advancement of lax,
and sometimes drafted-to-order legislation, TNCs have achieved headline
economic, political, environmental, social and employment benefits, none of
which are exactly grounded in ethics and the promotion of human rights. The
question of abolishing either of the two perspectives (private or public), apart
from being impossible other than in exceptional situations, brings to mind the
sheer quantity of interrelations and interdependencies which exist between
both. The two feedback and mimic one another, often making it difficult to
distinguish which is which. As stated by Naím49, the power exhibited by some
organisations has even infiltrated national and international bodies and admi-
nistrations. Now more than ever do the writings of Kapuscinski ring true:
“To the eyes of the average Iranian the Great Civilisation, that is the Re-
volution of the Shah and the People, was nothing more than the Great
Pillaging carried out by the elite. All those with some element of power
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engaged in the theft. If there were someone occupying an important po-
sition who did not wish to steal, he would find himself isolated and held
in suspicion. Everyone would say of him: he is certainly a spy sent to de-
nounce which of us is stealing, and how much, since such information is
necessary to our enemies”50.
The benficiaries of illicit acts of corruption may be very diverse: from in-
dividuals, castes, enterprises, organisations, adminstrations, to governments
with economic interests and persons with unmentionable relationships and
remunerations. Maingot states that there is no “general theory of curruption”
51. In the public sphere, according to Brizio52, this is a social phenomenon
through which a public servant is impelled to act contrary to law, regulation
and accepted practice in order to favour private interests. Such a circumstance
confirms the existing difficulty in arriving at a unanimous definition. It is suf-
ficient to examine as an example Verger’s report53 on the ex-president of Ni-
caragua, Violeta Chamorro (1990-94). Under her administration, 341 out of
351 state enterprises were sold off at 75% of their market value. Tanzi54, re-
ferring to public contracts, indicates that corrupt civil servants are able to au-
thorise the use of sub-standard materials for public works, as well as cutting
back on the products and services initially contracted. Hines states that high-
tech defence projects, such as in the case of the international trade in military
aircraft, are especially susceptible to corruption55.
However, there is no limitation to the military sphere only, since co-
rruption may be legalised and democtratised in any area of private and pro-
fessional life. In Europe, lobbies are legal and are indeed held on an official
EU register56, despite not being obliged to publish for whom they work (in-
cluding whatever chain of suppliers and economic interrelationships there may
be behind them), what remunerations they receive, nor even, most impor-
tantly, who supervises their activities, and by what means, there being no re-
gulatory bodies. In fact, there is no way to truly regulate a pseudo-legal body,
when it has been intentionally designed to be invisible. Themodus operandi va-
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53 Verger, A. (2003), p. 45.
54 Tanzi, V. (1990).
55 Hines, J. R. (1995).
56 A transparency register of the EU in which one may search for, register or update an ‘organisation’,
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REVISTA EMPRESA Y HUMANISMO / VOL XXI / Nº 2 / 2018 / 123-184138
ries, but the who-is-who of their regulatroy bureaucracy is fully understood
and how this relates to their ability to manoeuvre any state or supranational
body. TNCs claim that it would be unfair for a government to take decisions
without listening to businesses, which is an extraordinary assertion conside-
ring that TNCs permeate all aspects of social and institutional affairs57. Lob-
bies call themselves ‘pressure groups’, reflecting the fact that their purpose is
to persuade third parties, be that an enterprise, state, or to influence in local
legislation (to favour the interests of the corporation which bankrolls them)
or transnational legislation (e.g., regualtions on permitted chemical substan-
ces58, and free-trade treaties affecting commerce in its strict sense, such as
TTIP, TPP, TiSA and CETA). According to Laurens:
“Could such a group as EADS (European Aeronautic Defence and
Space) maintain a position in the area of aviation and defence without
each year investing 4.5 million euros in exerting pressure on Brussels?
Surely not. At the same time, the company receives 39 million euros in
direct annual subsidies from the European administration, and 239.7 mi-
llion euros of indirect funding from the Commission in the form of pu-
blic contracts”59.
In the European Union alone, there are 1,400 treaties60, which have con-
solidated the private system of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), and
encouraged development toward the Multilateral Investment Court (MIC).
There is at present no empirical proof which indicates that free-trade agree-
ments encourage foreign investment61, rather there is evidence that, on the
contrary, foreign enterprises are given preferential treatment over local busi-
nesses62 through these vehicles, which are really a mechanism of abuse utilised
by TNCs with a view to becoming standardised systematically63 in accordance
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60 The European Commission Proposes a Move Towards a Multilateral Investment Court System. Fa-
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61 Sauvant, K. P. & Sachs, L. E. (2009).
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with one simple criterion: win-win. All investments risks are eliminated, sub-
jugating even governments—despite lacking the training, means, or resour-
ces of the states which created these systems—to accept conditions which li-
mit any kind of legislation designed to improve the quality of life of the people
at the expense of the profits of TNCs.
This also has the effect of promoting an unprecedented lack of ethics64
on the part of TNCs, as well as establishing and encouraging a jurisdictional
regression65 in the authority of each state. The exclusion of domestic legal sta-
tutes is made a condition sine qua non for the establishment of trade treaties, in
such a way that, in accepting these agreements, implicit consent is given to all
of the aforementioned abuses, effectively eliminating the power of local legal
rulings, since all disputes (between states and TNCs) are then resolved by ar-
bitration panels of private interests. Taking all of this into consideration, Ben-
said’s contention that “we are in the age of the mercantilisation and privatisa-
tion of the world” 66 cannot be viewed as a mere trend, when free trade treaties
are the prime mover of international relations. According to Hernández Zu-
bizarreta & Ramiro:
“The totality of trade and investment treaties and agreements which per-
meates the whole planet corresponds to the legal logic of the feudalisa-
tion of the global regulatory system. This feudal system breaks and rein-
terprets the classic principles of the rule of law, and is articulated through
the privatisation of legislative and judicial power. Public regulatory bo-
dies are subordinated to private ones which infringe on the rights of the
greater part of societies and peoples. What is more, it corresponds to the
interests of capital, of the dominant classes, and of complicit govern-
ments”67.
The evolution of corruption
Corruption has gone from being a mere cultural phenomenon to being
accepted by society and by corporations as a cause of processes of develop-
REVISTA EMPRESA Y HUMANISMO / VOL XXI / Nº 2/ 2018 / 123-184 139
CORRUPTION IN THE TRANSNATIONAL TEXTILE INDUSTRY: AN EXCEPTION OR THE
RULE?
64 Luque, A & de Pablos, C. (2016a).
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ment, or even a fashion, as stated by Galtung68. Contentions such as those of
Barnet and Muller make more sense than ever before: “the men who run the
global corporations are the first in history with the organisation, technology,
capital and ideology to make a credible try at managing the world as an inte-
grated unit”69. This also makes corruption a global phenomenon able to trans-
cend borders and move without hindrance.
Irresponsible management on the part of business leaders or politicians
has fostered a growing loss of legitimacy and trustworthiness70 in enterprises
due to continual and systematic abuses, and due, in many cases, to irresponsi-
ble corporate behaviour71, including a lack of social and environmental jus-
tice72. Ethical crises encourage epidemics of avarice, fraud, improper con-
duct73, or the creation of fictitious situations whose only purpose is to
engender remunerations of various kinds, in such a way as to make routine the
erosion of the principles underpinning all democratic societies.
Let there be no doubt that for this situation—somewhat pernicious in
many cases—to occur, something must have gone wrong at the level of orga-
nisations or society, and at the level of their individual members, on whom
must be laid the greater share of the blame. They have chosen the conduct
which they exhibit, albeit conditioned by the pressures and urgent needs they
experience, and further conditioned by their surroundings, lives, contexts, etc.
Meanwhile the other part of the responsibility for this ethical problem falls
on the supervisory authorities which have prepared the way for all manner of
illicit behaviour through their lack of monitoring, and the absence or weak-
ness of legislation. Horkheimer74 points to fraud as the dominant archetype,
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S. Laurens in Le Monde Diplomatique 09/2015, p. 25.
74 Horkheimer, M. (1982) and (1988).
brought about by regulations drafted to the order of corrupt multinationals
or powerful individuals. These engender risk, and look the other way, while
promoting the interests of third parties. These ideas strengthen the view that
there are failings in the marketplace, which is not in a position to regulate it-
self adequately. As Horkheimer contends “the economy largely lacks its own
dynamic. It lost its own power in the face of economic power” 75.
What is needed in order for corruption to appear?
The main purpose of corruption is the generation of some kind of bene-
fit, usually of an illicit nature76, since it lacks any moral compass77. These pro-
cesses are not only confined to faraway democracies and dictatorships, but
equally exist in the developed or ‘first’ world. In Sandel’s view:
“[…] putting a price on all human activities can be corrupting. Consider
voting. No democracies officially permit the buying and selling of votes.
To sell my vote would be to degrade it, to corrupt its meaning as an ex-
pression of civic duty. But if a market in votes is objectionable because it
corrupts democracy, what about systems of campaign finance (including
the one currently in place in the US) that give wealthy donors a dispro-
portionate voice in elections? […]”78.
Ethically speaking, corruption occurs when an individual infringes the
prevailing corporate norms or deontological code in order to cause both be-
nefit and harm, since this will lead directly or indirectly to either. Elegido79
contends that, in situations of bribery or extortion, at least four principles are
broken: 1) that of being induced to take wrong decisions, 2) that of not adop-
ting any measures to avoid corruption, 3) that of misappropriation and 4) that
of not taking the necessary steps to correct this behaviour.
Corruption, at the same time as it generates profits for the enterprise,
modifies behaviour and values. In the opinion of professor of public revenues,
Zubiri:
“The worst thing is not the waste of public funds, but rather the setback
that the country suffers: public contracts are not given to the most effi-
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cient, but to the most adept in bribery and knowledge of the ins-and-outs
of government; in the end, the general sensation is that merit and pro-
ductivity have no value”80.
Corruption is not “in essence a mere legal affair, it is basically a matter of
morality”, assuming that stealing out of the necessity of feeding oneself is not
to be judged the same as illicit personal enrichment. Individuals may act co-
rruptly for moral purposes: the so-called “corruption for noble causes”81. To
Horkheimer “the borders between respectable and illegal fraud are uncer-
tain”82. This confusion can arise from a multiplicity of situations, such as legal
lacunae or imperfections in the market, and attenuating circumstances may
also intervene, such as local regulations.
It is necessary to include a risk assessment in any corporate development
and trade agreement that affects ancestral rights (those of tribes, claims to te-
rritory or access to water, etc.). This involves identifying a possible clash of
rights not only in order to avoid any action that infringes the law, but also to
prevent the bulldozing of the acquired rights of peoples in areas where indus-
trial development is to take place. On occasion, these rights are not acknow-
ledged by the dominant system, including governments themselves, encoura-
ged by the desire to reach trade objectives, and results in an oxymoron of
rights. Consultations to the Permanent People’s Tribunal can be a useful ethi-
cal indicator at an international level, since these report cases of the systema-
tic violation of basic human rights. According to Anaya:
“[…] This regulatory framework requires laws or regulations which in-
corporate international rules concerning indigenous rights and which put
them to work through the administrative apparatus of the state that go-
verns landholding, mining, petroleum and gas exploration and other as-
pects of the exploitation and development of natural resources. In ge-
neral, regulatory frameworks of this type are not to be found in all of the
world’s states”83.
Underdeveloped countries tend to favour multinationals in return for
some kind of benefit or caprice84and TNCs take advantage of this. In this
sense, in Kaipl’s view “[…] lamentably, from centuries ago to the present, nu-
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merous textile producers have found regions (countries) of the world with suf-
ficient legal insecurity to be able to produce through large-scale exploitation
at little cost”85. According to Nieto de Alba86 the weaker the ethics, the grea-
ter the likelihood of corruption. On occasion, it is the result of different fac-
tors, such as opportunity, the risk taken on, or the profit obtained. To Zie-
gler: “wherever corruption wreaks havoc, those countries are prey to the
predators of globalised financial capital who are able to dispose of the world
at their whim”87.
In the view of Clements, Hugounenq & Schwartz88, and separatley of
Ades & di Tella89, through government grants corruption is modelled as a
function of industrial policy which relates subsidies to levels of corruption.
Tanzi90 analyses the relationship between civil servants and their family mem-
bers, in which the opportunity of doing favours among themselves is increa-
sed, and also finds that wherever corruption is most rife, candidates for poli-
tical posts are most corruptible, being prepared to pay large sums in order to
secure their goal.
The World Bank (1983) maintains that control over prices allows enter-
prises to operate with prices different to those of the marketplace, thereby cre-
ating an economic fiction in which they are able to pervert, for their own be-
nefit, both the preponderate economic system (TNCs and supranational
bodies) together with the economic reality. This is synonymous with corrup-
tion. Another aspect is the discretionary character of foreign currency ex-
changes, which may be used at will for advantage, a fact which causes insecu-
rity and forces the search for alternative alegal avenues. Low wages, which
often are not sufficient even to cover basic needs, compel the use of positions
of employment as a stepping-stone to accessing other sources of income.
Sachs &Warner91 analyse economies rich in resources, which are more likely
to show a behaviour of accrueing extreme levels of revenue than other eco-
nomies (these resources may always be sold at the maximum price occasioned
by their extraction). According to George, this is similar to the processes of
globalisation and foments:
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“the advancement of the worst operator in terms of social and environ-
mental policy as well as of wages and working conditions. Under its in-
fluence, the citizen is nothing more than a consumer, and equality before
the law becomes, for transnational firms, a simple ‘code of conduct” 92.
III. CONDITIONS WHICH MAKE CORRUPTION POSSIBLE
In general, there are different methods by which corruption takes root
and develops. Many of these are have not been documented, but implicitly the
following elements may be identified:
1) engendering discretionary actions (ad hoc rules, or constantly-chan-
ging procedures, which are, by definition, difficult to trace and eradicate);
2) creating the necessary climate for favouring self-interest, such as gi-
ving planning permission to the company of a family member (or withholding
permission form a clear rival), or a sector from which some kind of benefit
may be obtained;
3) introducing additional costs where none exist, thereby overpricing the
product and creating legal insecurity;
4) encouraging extortion as the counterweight to profit;
5) discouraging investigation and auditing (including those of an indirect
nature); in the words of the Setem organization: “Audits [of the factories of
Tazreen, Rana Plaza, or Ali Enterprise in Bangladesh] were incapable not only
of protecting the lives of employees in those factories, but also of identifying
infringements of the companies’ own codes of conduct”93.
According to a report by the European Parliament94, there are different
modes of tax evasion used in developing countries, such as:
1) deliberately flawed or inexistent declarations of personal income or
corporate profits, with a view to avoiding revenue taxation or other fiscal bur-
dens;
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2) manipulation of market prices through fraudulent invoicing between
exporters and importers working in collusion, which is a common way to
transfer funds illegally from a developing country to offshore bank accounts in
order to avoid taxation;
3) the evasion of VAT through false declarations of commercial transac-
tions;
4) bribery of taxation officers. This is characteristic of developing coun-
tries, and itself encourages further tax-avoidance tactics, such as the masking
of profits through the use of legal loopholes (which may, or may not be of de-
liberate creation) in the existing fiscal legislation95, commonly through the de-
liberate placing of invisible assets, such as patents and property rights, etc. As
an example, The New York Times detailed themodi operandi of Bangladeshi bu-
reaucracy, in this case of a Mr. Kader, the acting mayor of Savar, who stated:
“You must understand the reality in Bangladesh. These people who are
setting up industries and factories here are much more powerful than me.
When a government minister calls me and tells me to give permission to so-
meone to set up a factory in Savar, I cannot refuse”96.
IV. THE NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF CORRUPTION
Evaluating to a first approximation actions of these characteristics and
their effects would be something more than bold, especially if exogenous fac-
tors, such as the existing submerged economy, are taken into account. Ho-
wever, as the business publication Finanzas contends: “the difficulty of mea-
suring this phenomenon in no impediment to confirming its existence”97.
According to the European Commission98, more than 11% of work in the EU
private sector is undeclared, with the figure possibly rising to 20% in Eastern
European countries, such as Poland or Lithuania99. 4% of those surveyed ad-
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mitted having themselves received an undeclared payment in return for work,
while 1 in 30 (3%) received part of their wages ‘cash-in-hand’.
The creation of illicit profits engenders greater inequalities in the distri-
bution of income100. Currently, 225 millionaire families possess incomes equi-
valent to 2.5 billion people in employment, as shown by van den Eynde101 and
Cohen & Ligammari102, which constitutes a political and economic power
bloc. Families and TNCs with great resources (such as those indicated above)
have the capacity to lay the foundations of regulations, which may then be
aligned with their interests, but far removed from those of ordinary people.
The establishment of legal defenses beyond the reach of most rivals and sta-
tes is a key feature which generates processes of legal inequality. Being ‘poor’
does not imply being more ethical, but it does mean that the effect of one’s
currupt actions are more limited. From this, it follows that a lack of monito-
ring and effective legislation of the source of corporate profits on a gigantic
scale, in the case of the textile industry, may bring with it implicit processes
of corruption. As the European Parliament asserts:
“In 2011, domestic resources lost by developing countries to IFFs added
up to over 630 billion USD, equivalent to 4.3% of developing country
GDP (with LICs being particularly affected). Illicit flows are only one
way that developing countries lose out on tax revenues from corpora-
tions. Abusive tax avoidance—where companies try to dodge taxes
through complex internal structures and by finding loopholes in tax
laws—is another significant problem.”103.
The EU experiences great difficulty in investigating and publishing
about companies with corrupt and ethically questionable practices104, while
showing little interest in their eradication. The World Bank points to co-
rruption as the single greatest impediment to achieving economic develop-
ment105. In Jain’s opinion106, corruption may increase costs and lower produc-
tion, and even provoke a loss of quality or the misuse of apportioned time on
tasks which have no connection with fulfilling the order107. As claimed by
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Gupta, Davoodi & Alonso-Terme108, and by Lambsdorff109, the processes of
corruption encourage inconsistency in the treatment of the same procedures.
Murphy, Shleifery & Vishny anaylse the occurrence of “rent seeking” si-
tuations110, which provide more lucrative opportunities than does productive
activity. Alcaide Zugaza & Larrú Ramos111, and Sanahuja112 analyse, from dif-
ferent perspectives, the possibility that the effects of corruption reduce the ef-
fectiveness of international aid in connection with the deviation of funds. This
takes on particular importance in developing countries, in which “in addition
to the problem of misorientation, the situation is aggravated by abject co-
rruption and bureaucratic inefficiency”, as Alesina states113.
Corruption causes great harm to society and to all its components and
related aspects. The appearance of corrupt actions or behaviour diminishes
the credibility of the system and blurs the conditions of transparency which
are necessary for any kind of industrial or corporate activity, including those
of the most basic human characteristics. It engenders distrust, harms trade
(on any scale) and can even set itself up as a model to be followed. Timofeyev,
in his analysis of the situation in the former Soviet Union, makes reference to
“metacorruption […] as a stage beyond corruption; it is the corruption of the
corruptors, when corrupt power no longer hides its corruption […] it is a new
form of anomie, anomie squared”114.
In relation to international aid, countries have begun to consider achie-
ving greater control over the aid they assign to third-party countries, limiting
it to those which have the best government policies for preventing the un-
productive use of public expenditure115. This corroborates the inefficacy of
international projects, caused by economic mismanagement. Investment in
less efficient public expenditure (chiefly on education and health) tends be
more susceptible to private appropriation through large-scale projects, as well
as lower tax revenue, as claimed by Tanzi & Davoodi116, and Mauro117. In Rus-
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sia, there are signs that corruption grew markedly in the 1990s, creating a
clear connection with the processes of widespread privatisation118. These pro-
cesses may diminish some kinds of state corruption, although they may, at the
same time, encourage opportunities for private individuals to corrupt a
country’s civil servants119; in fact, the processes of privatisation and the growth
of market competition do not always reduce levels of corruption120. Hun-
tington states that “in terms of economic growth, the only thing worse than a
society with a rigid, over-centralized and dishonest bureaucracy, is a society
with a rigid, over-centralized and honest bureaucracy”121. Other authors cri-
ticise this positivist view of corruption122.
Large corporations influence the election of those in government, in
many cases by remote control through companies designed to favour their in-
terests. Some enterprises explore the limits of the system—legal or illegal—in
order to corrupt the state. Indeed, in Kwame Sundaram’s view:
“The level of corruption in the private sector remains disturbingly high.
[…] Such practices are all too often encouraged by or met with coopera-
tion from civil servants, many of whom may be underpaid and hence
struggling to make ends meet, or corrupt political leaders who use poli-
tics to make money that they may claim they need to advance their poli-
tical ends or to pay for political support. Some who amass huge fortunes
while in office may smuggle these assets out of their countries into se-
cret personal bank accounts abroad”123.
At the socio-political level
Social reality is established through structures which contain social ru-
les124. These may be undermined by organised corruption, as inidicated by
Kaufmann & Siegelbaum125, and involve moral rupture and deterioration, as
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well as generating social learning routines which encourage less-than-ethical,
or indeed immoral behaviour that often infringes on current legislation. It is
assumed that social rules are in some way normative in character and are ba-
sed on habits, given that “the essence of beliefs is the establishment of a ha-
bit”126. Schumpeter contends that “no social system can work that is based ex-
clusively upon a network of free contracts between (legally) equal contracting
parties and in which everyone is supposed to be guided by nothing except his
own (short-run) utilitarian ends”127. Additionally, in agreement with Com-
mons128 and Samuels129, legal rules cannot arise privately as habitual norms,
but rather require the support of the state. This opinion is very much in line
with that of Iglesias, the former president of the Inter-American Development
Bank and former executive secretary of the economic commission ECLAC,
who asserts:
“A democratic rule of law guarantees both legal and political stability and
security, which are indispensable for investment and growth, and which
also allow efficient state intervention for the purposes of redistribution
and social equity”130.
Corruption undermines any kind of political action, however laudable
that may be, as it destroys the principle of equality for all, and thereby pro-
duces differing results in hypothetically equal situations131. This malpractice
also runs the risk of ‘contagion’, a term which is used in various models, such
as those of Andvig &Moene132; Sah133; Tirole134; Cartier-Bresson135, and Mis-
hra136. Even in Johnston’s view137, it could pave the way for the perpetration
of coups d’etát, which in turn may further foment, if that were possible, the
procedures of corruption.
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According to Tanzi & Davoodi138, with corruption comes a move toward
private profit which leads to a lower return for society. Murphy, Shleifer and
Vishny, in their political analysis, define corruption as “the sale of government
property by civil servants for personal gain”139. At the corporate level, co-
rruption can cause all manner of harm, even ruining true centres of business
and commerce in a question of hours140. Here, it must be kept in mind that
corruption in itself is difficult to measure, since it generally appears in con-
trast or comparison with something or someone else (indeed, it is impossible
to quantify all of these processes), although it is evident that more procedures
have been developed in corrupt enterprises through all manner of economic
artifice. What there is certainly evidence of, is the consequences of corrup-
tion (other than personal ones). Various reports141 show that room for mano-
euvre is reduced, business-confidence is lost, conflicts are created, fines are
incurred from regulators and tribunals, corporate reputation is damaged, and
compromises are made in order to be able to operate and invest.
Within the processes of corruption, it is worth highlighting the public
aspect proposed by Ross, who identifies the elements of the gathering of in-
formation, the violation of human rights, state-sponsored crime and violence,
and points to the detriments “committed by individuals who abuse their state
authority, or who use it erringly when working with individuals or organisa-
tions of the private sector142. There is a thin line separating public and private
affairs. One is put in mind of phenomenon of the revolving door, in which
some of the offices of state institutions pass over to the private sphere (or vi-
ceversa), and of the regulatory inefficacy in all of the aforementioned situa-
tions.
Another effect of ‘legalised’ corruption is that which is generated by the
geography of transnational relations. As Sassen, professor of sociology at the
University of Colombia indicates:
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“The key point in this configuration is the weakening of the formal and
exclusive authority of states over national territory. This facilitates the
creation of trans- and subnational spaces and agents in economic pro-
cesses, as well as in political and civil cultures” 143.
Therefore, a weakening of its institutions is not in the interests of the
majority of the civilian population, since a weak state, as we have already seen,
is more vulnerable to corrupt behaviours. What is more, it makes common-
place such situations that ought to be extraordinary by permitting, by way of
example, that a kilo of rice grown and sold in Senegal be more expensive than
one imported from Thailand144. The processes of transnational textile pro-
duction principally unfold in developing countries, forcing employees to ac-
cept miserable working conditions. According to the professor of economics
of the University of Jahangirnagar in Bangladesh, Anu Muhammad:
“Bangladesh did not always live under the rule of the manufacture of ap-
parel. Until the mid-1980s, the cultivation of jute was the principal
source of income for the country. Then the IMF [International Mone-
tary Fund] and the World Bank arrived. Under their aegis, privatisation
plans and cuts in public expenditure made unemployment soar, created a
dependence on imports, and started the collapse of local industries. The
bureaucrats of the main political parties, high-ranking officials of the
army and the police, and the sons of wealthy families fought over the
spoils. The incentives to invest in the textile industry became irresistible:
cheap labour, trade unions weakened by the privatisation of state com-
panies, and the elimination of import duties on machinery destined for
export industries. Corruption did the rest” 145.
The processes of corruption equally install themselves in advanced coun-
tries. As an example, let us take the footwear industry in the eastern areas of
Spain, particularly in Elche, Elda and the surrounding area (there is a similar
issue in Galicia, Spain, centred on the textile sector). In this region there are
hundreds of clandestine workshops, in which a largely female workforce is em-
ployed, who work from home or from shared private premises146. The origins
of this informal labour lie in the supposed need to contribute to the family in-
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come, based on the false idea that women would be unable to take on full-time
work (due to childcare and other family obligations, and indeed male chauvi-
nism). Currently, for many women this is the only source of economic subsis-
tence. In these dark areas, the lack of employment rights is considered nor-
mal, as is the absence of unions or of inspectors of working conditions, who
lack resources and dedicate their time to compiling statistics. As a result, these
workers find themselves in precarious conditions, with low wages and no hope
of receiving a pension, having made no social security contributions. A great
proportion of employment activity is done outside of the factory, clandesti-
nely, although most of the profits of labour do not come back to the workers,
but rather go to the businesses which farm out the work, and to intermedia-
ries.
In addition, the omertà code of silence with which this work is carried
out, and the impunity enjoyed by the ‘big family’ of clandestine workshops,
make the individual who wishes to claim their rights seem at fault or persona
non grata, rather than the delinquent people or organisations who normalise
the processes of corruption through their unethical behaviour. Having a con-
tract, being paid for overtime, the right to holidays or sick-days are all alien to
this situation. Many clandestine workshops have an unwritten code whereby
any worker who files a complaint is automatically expelled and excluded from
any future involvement with these pirate businesses. One need not look to re-
mote workshops in Asia: this normalised informality147 of working practices
can be found at just two hours’ flight from Brussels, one of the principal cen-
tres of transnational decision-making in the world.
The unlooked-for effects of corruption
In certain contexts, corruption may be the only escape route, due to the
existence, per se, of a corrupt environment, which makes it necessary to be-
come corrupt in order to compete on a level playing field within the other-
wise unequal circumstances created by this situation. In the transnational tex-
tile sector, this situation can be aggravated by the development of the
processes of monopsony, a lack of competition and an institutional bias to-
ward one investor or another.
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Lui148 points out that corrupt procedures may make rigid administrative
processes more agile with the purpose of generating profits and, therefore,
improving the inefficient management of resources. He also contends that
bribery may reduce delays and incentivise civil servants. Leff149 & Hunting-
ton150 maintain that the benefits of corruption may be greater than its costs. As
Cortina151 asserts, in many cases the effects of corruption are negligible and
those who use corrupt tactics may find them favourable, although there may
also be cases where some low-level sanctions are incurred.
In the textile sector, a broad spectrum of effects is produced. On the one
hand, environmental effects and on the other, chiefly social and economic
ones. The use, abuse and the deliberate miscoordination of scant environ-
mental policies on a global and local level produce unwanted effects, both
through action and omission, on society and the natural surroundings, flatte-
ning any hindrance to the interests of TNCs and governments avid for inves-
tment. As an example, for the manufacture of garments, TN textile compa-
nies make intensive use of vast quantities of water at a lower cost than that
applied to human consumption. Even if the prices were made the same, the
cost incurred by the TN textile companies would still be lower than it should
be, given the scarcity of the resource and the object of its use. It is necessary
to bear in mind the paucity of water resources worldwide, and the fact that
the uses of this resource by TN textile companies are non-essential, the con-
sequences of which should be regulated in proportion to its effects. TNCs,
through regulatory pressure in their favour, afford themselves an à-la-carte
and incomplete treatment of their waste-water152, as well as permitting them-
selves to produce a large quantity of waste as a by-product of their use of che-
micals in the industrial process. This last aspect has been the subject of innu-
merable studies showing many of these substances to be highly toxic to health
and the environment. In other cases, the danger is yet unknown, but taken to-
gether, the situation points inexorably to the need for a total ban on such che-
micals until proof be produced of their harmlessness.
Any such studies should not be published at the service of the TN textile
companies themselves – or indeed any other interested party. This would be
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like providing a friendly reference for a jobseeker or aspirant to a degree pro-
gramme, that is to say, of little use other than documenting the corruption in
the system and providing good material for comedy. There are, of course, no
bad references for candidates, and the fact that it is the aspirants who ask for
recommendations from their referees makes such letters effectively worthless,
or indeed counter-productive. Yet these are analogous to the studies which are
promoted, backed, sponsored, etc., by TNCs, or by academic institutions in
the service of private interests. Such a circumstance is extremely difficult to
remedy due to the de facto union between lobbies, supranational bodies and
the TNCs, wherein all manner of shortcomings may be found, but certainly
not a lack of economic power, this often being an essential instrument for the
achievement of their objectives. In the view of Romano, an expert in this field:
“Spanish and European regulations permit the use of all chemical subs-
tances that are not expressly banned. That is, their use is allowed unless
it be proven they pose an unacceptable risk to health and/or the envi-
ronment. This burden of proof implies a long process of risk-assessment,
so that the Commission or a member-state would have to be concerned
enough about the effects of a substance to wish to prepare a restriction
dossier”153.
The textile industry contributes to global warming as the second largest
polluter on the planet, being responsible for around 20% of all toxic substan-
ces entering water sources. Textile manufacture involves the generation of 3%
of all carbon dioxide produced in the world, some 850 million tons. In addi-
tion, the recycling of garments ought to be similar to that of vehicle batteries,
owing to their non-biodegradable components, but this is far from a reality
where the long shadow of the textile industry is cast over a landscape of used
clothes for which it has no solution. At the same time, one of the essential
elements of the apparel industry is cotton, whose production involves a high
proportion of pesticide and insecticide use154. In the laboratory or in countries
with high standards, training, preventions and sanctions (where necessary) for
their use, such substances may be very effective. However, in states with high
levels of illiteracy, corruption, poor training, rudimentary systems of preven-
tion and inexistent provision for their processing and treatment, they are per-
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nicious contaminants. In regard to countries in which textile production ta-
kes place, often irreparable harm and abuse occurs due to the fragility of the
state. A slave-like dependency may develop in the mind of the farmer who sees
the purchase of certain chemical products (pesticides, insecticides, fertilizers,
dyes, colour-fixers, etc.) and seeds as tantamount to enjoying unlimited har-
vests. It will be necessary to improve competition, through global regulation,
among the biotechnology companies which produce seeds. This market
should not be allowed to be cornered by a handful of companies, nor should
state projects be allowed to develop which serve the agricultural sector by ac-
ting as a commercial counter-weight. In this way transparency may be foste-
red as a pillar of a democratised transnational textile industry.
The consequences of this type of corruption, centred on the abuse and
use of the existing spurious legislation, are broad and varied, and in many ca-
ses also unpredictable. Among the most important are the harmful effects on
health (contamination, endocrine disruptors, environmental risk-externalisa-
tion to countries with low standards, etc.), making society even poorer, if it
were possible, and one which not only fails to advance toward a more ethical
and sustainable production, but which rather regresses. This may be seen in
both underdeveloped or developing countries (the mainstay of textile pro-
duction) and in advanced states which boast of their white-collar-wearing and
briefcase-carrying status. In either case profits are boosted by a business mo-
del based on environmental, social and economic overexploitation and the ex-
haustion of labour resources. This image is very far removed from that of the
truly ethical enterprise, however much corporations may style themselves as
such.
There is no doubt that the effects of corruption vary greatly in function
of the situation (market, culture, point in history, ethnic considerations, geo-
politics, or the prevailing forces of supply and demand) we wish to describe.
Beyond merely trivial depictions, which are always negative since they focus
on misconduct, collateral effects, lack of morality and the loss of value, among
other considerations, Baumhart highlights the more existential questions of
corruption:
“Around the world, we are frequently described as being corporate so-
cieties. If this is so, and if it is judged that corporations are corrupt, then
it will be assumed that the society itself is corrupt”155.
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At the level of society, corruption (in the textile sector) takes partisan ad-
vantage of scarce and obsolete labour regulation in lands where few demo-
cratic guarantees are asked for. An underground world of businesses (dealing
with logistics, dyeing, clothes-manufacture, etc.) and vested interests inter-
connect in the service of TNCs which, through an auctioning of rights and
liberties to the lowest bidder, base their business on lower employment costs,
fewer environmental restrictions, weaker unionism, and repression-at-will
(e.g. with the collusion of the army and police), etc. Such a scenario is no-
thing short of the perversion of international trade and ethics. TNCs offer
their business to any textile workshop, or unscrupulous government (gene-
rally speaking, TNCs have not included scruples in their enterprise vision)
with the purpose of receiving their ‘investments’, often through agreements
that guarantee them not to make a loss. This win-win situation, which is proof
against even the slightest of risks, external or inherent, is tantamount to theft.
Certain states place all of their infrastructure at the disposition of a tangled
web of textile interests, with all manner of regulatory manoeuvrings and flat-
tery that would make even a freshman student of constitutional law cringe.
Constitutional indeed, as this is replaced by mercantile law, thereby subver-
ting the fundamental legal pecking-order, allowing the prevalence of the rule
of trade. Government and public authorities are deregulated, both in their re-
lationships with citizens and with other organs of state, disturbing the normal
development and protection offered to these. These states renounce their
obligations, ceding sovereignty to TNCs, decision-making bodies whose con-
trol and influence are not designed for such an end.
From this it follows that many TNCs are not in fact enterprises, but ra-
ther predatory and short-termist systems, which have no qualms about the
harmful effects on the environment of their activity, and abuse all manner of
legislation for their own profit. They abuse the very soul of the workforce they
employ, while perhaps believing they have none at all. This presents a very
different view from that of a truly sustainable enterprise which operates in an
ethical and responsible manner, showing how the natural advance of the ti-
mes need not be in conflict with the development and growth of the ancient
and noble activity of textile production, and indeed trade in general. There
are legal, technical and economic mechanisms (a lightened tax burden, for
example) able to promote this type of company and industrial development,
encouraging the coexistence of all the intervening parties with the purpose of
allowing every one of the nations to develop, and preventing overexploitation
and the loss of identity.
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CONCLUSIONS
It is evident that, where the processes of corruption take root, the situa-
tion tends to the extreme and the delicate, influenced by either the action or
the omission of any irradiating element. Human rights are affected, together
with all spheres of the private and professional life of individuals and living
beings. It should be pointed out that the incidence of this is not the same at all
the latitudes and contexts in which it occurs, since it is often necessary to use
different routes of access to corporations and their components, in order to
be able to develop without disturbing the living ecosystem of which every co-
rrupt society consists.
At the economic level, the nexus imposed in human relations, there is a
broad series of negative effects capable of generating processes of corruption,
such as tax evasion, the creation of uncertainties, the subjugation of workers to
the dilemma of accepting inhuman working conditions, or else face the like-
lihood of being without the means of subsistence for themselves and all of
their dependents. Public expenditure is also affected, as tax revenue is dimi-
nished. Furthermore, certain psychologically disturbing aspects are also cre-
ated, such as locating employees thousands of kilometres from their homes
(leaving their children and elderly in the hands of other family members), of-
ten without the chance of visiting them more than twice a year, or making
them work in conditions similar to a concentration camp, with limited access
to fundamental employee’s rights.
It could be claimed that a model based on privatisation, and the growth
of competition does not always diminish corruption. Indeed, it is necessary
to limit entitlements and prerogatives, and to install legislation that is trus-
tworthy and accessible, with the additional condition that it may be supervi-
sed and delimited from without, in accord with the conditions in each loca-
tion.
It is necessary to analyse the various existing needs in the principle tex-
tile-producing countries, with the purpose of preventing the infringement of
human rights in countries offering a subcontracted labour force among other
resources, as well as excluding TNCs from any part of the process. Govern-
ments which interfere in the regulation of the transnational textile business
also bear legal and ethical responsibility, since investments depend largely on
the behaviour and actions of governance (including that of corporations). Poor
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countries are seduced by the plethora of kindnesses implied by TNCs and
other bodies which break their promises, such as ratings agencies and banks in
their service. This encourages an impoverishing kind of growth for the sakes
of ‘the promotion of trade’ and of advanced countries which prefer to look the
other way, invoking the processes of CSR as an excuse for their passivity.
These policies are deliberately constructed without rigour and with a double
standard. They are rolled out in a different way, for effect and impact on the
parent company, affiliate or subcontractor that depend clearly on TN textile
companies. This circumstance turns ‘advanced’ countries and supranational
authorities into partners-in-crime as accessories to the perpetration of crimes
against humanity derived from their negligent conduct. All this for the sake
of commercial self-regulation, which encourages, in the case of the transna-
tional textile industry, a fratricidal struggle to cut costs and an obscene scram-
ble to curb rights. TNCs reduce their costs by imposing conditions on textile
workshops and governments (through regulations, and mobilising the army
to protect their investments, etc., leaving them almost without room for ma-
noeuvre. Threats are used constantly, systematically (and deviously) shielded
behind free trade, in order to transfer their production to other, more econo-
mical and discrete places around the world. For certain TNCs, all kinds of
employment, social or environmental rights are merely incidental.
This is the true Gordian knot, where the dignity of people and land is vie-
wed as expendable rather than as a crucible of opportunity, while more people
are drawn in as potential clients of the TNCs. These situations push labou-
rers to the border of the abyss, creating economic, environmental and hun-
ger-stricken refugees (having been expelled from their lands). This example
of globalisation must be included within the lists of crimes against humanity.
Against this, it is necessary to promote the dissolution of those TNCs and go-
vernments which irrefutably encourage the worst infringements pertaining to
the lives of people and living things. At the same time, protection and sup-
port should be afforded to ethical and sustainable enterprises which contri-
bute, by their acts, to reducing poverty and which follow a philosophy of iden-
tifying situations of systemic inequality. To achieve this, a direct connection
to the means of eliminating all kinds of corruption must be implemented, and
to make this a credible enterprise, there must be no hiding behind showy cor-
porate gestures of social responsibility. TNCs which have CSR policies in
place may be just as corrupt as those that have none.
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As the philosopher Gomá contends: “The problem is who decides what
is right or not”156. In a hypothetically ideal market, in which each element
works as part of a great symphony, (for example, government/state, interna-
tional regulation, good environmental practices, etc.) it would be just about
possible to accept the definitions of free trade provided by exclusive schools
of thought on this matter. However currently, the reality is quite different: not
all play by the same rules157, as can be seen in certain paralegal or minority-
interest media, which expose cases of corruption (often at the heart of society)
through the sentences of judges and tribunals, or the actions of ex-employees
or disgruntled managers, etc. They do not hesitate in revealing the malprac-
tice of governments or corporations which falsely claim to have good records
or ephemeral CSR policies. In other cases, this is an arduous task, since what
is not legal or is less moral in one continent, may be seen in a different way in
another, especially in the case of inhumanly long working hours, or in consi-
dering women inferior to men in all aspects, both of which are common in
countries geared to textile production. Here is a more advanced extension of
the concept of organisational corruption which shows motivations that go be-
yond those of private gain. Legislating without actually passing laws, as pro-
fessor Sánchez Barrilao contends, is an astute way of legislating158 for the sake
of private interests which wish to maintain the status quo and keep their le-
gally-backed pact of silence which has allowed them to adapt and permeate all
manner of powers.
The tyranny of practicism (the efficient way of carrying out tasks) is a
good example. This consists of appropriating optimising procedures and ba-
sic routines (often originally at no cost). A lack of regulation, or existing ni-
ches in the market are taken advantage of, such as in the fashion sector, where
this also occurs. Society in general, despite wishing to contribute to a sustai-
nable fashion industry that respects both people and environment, allows it-
self to be seduced by a well-packaged and produced, and customised type of
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Siemens that may be useful to the United States, albeit of no connection to national security, they
will take it all the same”. Sánchez, R. (2014).
158 Sánchez Barrilao, J. F. (2004), pp. 242-256.
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commerce. This becomes proactive in nature and is based on an easy, flexible
and cheap access to the acquisition of apparel, in which the concept of use,
disposal, and purchase is customary. It is cheaper to acquire a new t-shirt then
repair an old one. Practicism encourages the practice of what is easiest is best,
expelling other procedures and behaviours from the minds of consumers—
and therefore from the collective experience—making standard the expres-
sion of individualism through expenditure, in this case on a new purchase.
Even so, the easiest and cheapest need not be the most ethical or least corrupt;
indeed, choosing this behaviour will inexorably condition the means of pro-
duction and consumption. Textile production at the lowest possible cost is di-
rectly related to the proliferation of processes in the transnational textile sec-
tor which are legally asymmetrical and dysfunctional, thereby encouraging a
more unfair and less caring society.
This situation subsists on a lack of rights and guarantees for the weakest
members of the supply chain, from whom they extract a cheap, flexible and
easy production. The dividends resulting from the processes of practicism as-
sociated with a TN textile company’s production which is based on AI, dis-
placements, customised legislation, a lack of ethics (despite efforts at their pro-
pagation), environmental infringements and corruption, cannot be compared
with those received by the majority of the worldwide population marginali-
sed from the system, despite working on a temporary basis and limited in time,
space and rights. One may not argue against the profits generated by succes-
sive industrial revolutions, or the labour-saving in physical work, but one may
denounce the decided and self-governing nature of an algorithm (which may
be identified and linked directly to the company which creates it and profits
from it) which determines the working conditions in certain latitudes through
a real-time mathematical calculation of what ‘the customer is prepared to pay’.
The imperative of ease and pragmatism may overcome the larger part of the
social model based on rights, equality and common development by establi-
shing de facto the quantity of goods that can be produced at a low cost, but not
by determining the way in which they are produced.
Corruption remains in the service of the few with the capacity to use
their doctrine as a vehicle to intervene in lives and enterprises. The transna-
tional textile sector is infested with corrupt processes starting with the very
hedonism inherent to it. They are capable of institutionalising themselves to
the point of forming honed systems of corporate corruption, while creating a
certain relativism as a corollary. This is all masked behind showy acts and mar-
keting, and later behind CSR—currently version 2.0 of CSR—which inclu-
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des international framework agreements (IFAs), full of good intentions, but
limited in effect due to the lack of real and proportionate means of sufficient
weight to combat the processes of corruption in transnational textile produc-
tion. These circumstances once again set up the cosignatories (big corpora-
tions and the corresponding trade union federation) as overseers of the in-
fringements which they themselves commit, cover up or foment, albeit
indirectly.
The TNCs question all surrounding elements of the complex textile net-
work which may damage their dividends, yet rarely do they question their own
behaviour. Corruption is trivialised, thereby directly encouraging the dehu-
manisation of individuals for the sake of recovering capital (sometimes without
the need to do any work) through an ever more fluid supranational control.
An increasingly asymmetric architecture is constructed over the systematic
mercantilisation of human rights, subordinating all laws and actions against
corruption to the whim of the TN textile companies.
Guidelines for action
1) Avoid rolling out textile production in countries which have not rati-
fied the fundamental conventions of the ILO, as well as industrial and legis-
lative action which directly contravenes human rights. The UN, by using a
system of proportional representation (which eliminates the right of veto and
does not give preference to the same countries as it has since 1946), together
with the ILO can establish a mechanism for monitoring and sanctioning trans-
national business. They should also create a system of rewards for individuals,
companies and states that are truly ethical. What is more, it would be desira-
ble to establish protocols for anonymous whistle-blowing by citizens who wit-
ness any kind of infringement different from those typical of their place of re-
sidence. Denying a state or government the opportunity to purchase textiles
that have been manufactured in situations of semi-slavery, or through the fla-
grant contamination of the environment is a powerful dissuasive measure of
great impact.
2) Establish international tribunals with the capacity to sanction compa-
nies that develop corrupt processes, including throughout their value chain,
and establishing joint and several liability (liability for the actions of affiliates,
suppliers, contractors and subcontractors).
3) Prohibit, in processes of public purchases, the contracting of TN tex-
tile companies if they are shown to have committed, promoted or induced any
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kind of ethically questionable or corrupt procedure, in any of the lands in
which they operate, and establish in the process a scale of risks and illicit ac-
tions.
4) Audits, in their current configurations, form part of the textile busi-
ness, not an independent solution, since their remuneration depends directly
on the judgements they pass on the same companies which finance them. This
makes auditors both judge and interested party and invalidates them de facto.
5) The percentage of CSR invested by TN textile companies, in order to
be credible, must be in function of the profits they obtain, and respond to the
impact they have in the contexts in which they operate. For example, sponso-
ring a violin conservatory in Sweden (although in itself desirable) has no con-
nection with the activity of transnational corporations either in that country,
or in poorer states. The degree of expenditure and intervention in CSR should
also be monitored by bodies without any direct or indirect interests.
6) The criminal responsibility of enterprises ought to contemplate joint
liability: of the corporation – through fines and forced liquidations- and of the
directors of TNCs who have taken illegal decisions based on corruption. Of-
ten the cost of working through these procedures is less than that of fulfilling
their legal obligations.
7) International justice which offers real protection to informers (mone-
tary reward, change of identity, employment, repatriation, etc.) from the eli-
tes which control certain states (through their investments). Legal frameworks
should be established with the purpose of investigating and collecting evidence
of corrupt acts which offer payments with surcharges to TNCs in return for
the exploitation of public works, licences and access to natural resources (the
incidence of murder of activists is a good predictor of the need for a social and
environmental prosecution service). Nature itself, as the source of life, should
be considered as subject to rights. There are various verifiable organisations,
such as international trade unions or religious orders, which in certain con-
texts may be considered more trustworthy than local justice systems. A Con-
vention Relating to the Status of Economic Refugees has been proposed with the
purpose of providing international protection to whistle-blowers, and to pro-
secute corporate infringements at the transnational level (there are precedents
for this, such as the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea). International
justice must have the capacity to establish precautionary measures throughout
the value chain, and not limited to only one of the strands of the corporate
web designed to evade liabilities.
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8) In establishing trade treaties, these should be drawn up only in coun-
tries which respect human rights. Today, extreme poverty or forced migra-
tions are de facto human rights violations. Furthermore, mechanisms should
be installed to allow the reversal of these agreements when there is evidence
or reports of their harmful effects. Social and environmental clauses should
also be included.
9) The obligation to reveal the totality of the suppliers and intermedia-
ries which interact in the process of apparel manufacture, as well as in the la-
belling of products. Digital codes already exist which, appearing on the label
itself, can provide a link directly to a computer file. Taking refuge in situations
more appropriate to the Industrial Revolution does not make TNCs more
credible, honest, or ethical, despite the use of CSR measures, rather it makes
them jointly responsible for the development and encouragement of proces-
ses of corruption.
10) Universal and worldwide employment inspections, acting without
warning against any affiliate or remote workshop where textiles are manufac-
tured. Such an inspectorate may depend on the International Criminal Court
and in collaboration with the environmental prosecution service, since there
is often a connection between illicit acts. The costs of this public and univer-
sal supervision should be borne by the TNCs themselves. The employment
inspectorate ought to have the ability to ban a TNC from carrying out eco-
nomic activity in a certain country, if it has committed or promoted a contra-
vention (in acts of corruption) by shutting down all of its industrial activity in
the country affected.
11) Provide a unified set of criteria against tax evasion and avoidance
worldwide. The financial acrobatics of TN textile companies to avoid paying
taxes should be publicised, pursued and sanctioned in proportion to their eco-
nomic power.
12) What is the value of human life? Beyond the very obscenity of this
question, there is no doubt that indemnities paid for workplace accidents (let
us call to mind Rana Plaza in Bangladesh, and Karachi in Pakistan, etc.) have
been derisory; indeed in many cases, the payments have not reached their be-
neficiaries and there are missing bodies yet to be returned to families of the
deceased. There is an obligation to achieve the establishment and develop-
ment of coherent and real regulations which, in the case of infringement, may
be applied automatically, immediately and universally. Within the agreements
and treaties between TNCs and states, and in the commercial relations bet-
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ween subcontractors, there ought to be clauses and insurance policies which
establish joint and several liability throughout the value chain. The insurance
policies should be officially registered, and their solvency guaranteed, inclu-
ding their underwriting by both the state which supplies the intensive work-
force, and the state where the TNC headquarters is based, with the purpose
of preventing the acquiescence of either the TNC itself, or the subcontracted
workshop.
13) The creation of scientific peer commissions whenever new evidence
comes to light, originating in research and investigation by the scientific com-
munity, that warns of the dangers of the use of certain toxic substances by TN
textile companies. To this end, it is recommendable that the composition of
expert groups of international bodies be subject to a democratic process, in
order to prevent the application of pressure, bribery and the influence of
TNCs with vested interests, etc., and thereby improving transparency and
promoting confidence. Furthermore, resolutions passed by an international
body or other panel of experts may be subject to veto, if challenged by a cer-
tain proportion of a group of 25159 independent experts, economically disin-
terested in the outcome of the resolution. There are already instruments
which allow the delivery of anonymous and encrypted documents to members
of the scientific community who are able to pass speedy and anonymous jud-
gements on their content.
14) Establish TNCs’ biographical record as a document in the public do-
main, which every state may access and add to (possibly coordinated with a
UN-dependent watchdog with sanctioning powers), and in which may be re-
flected all sanctions, harmful effects, the number of ratified ILO conventions,
and knowledge of the whole supply chain used by the TNC. Codes rather
than names might be used, but with the important elements being the proof
that the corporation respects and promotes human rights and is therefore fit-
for-purpose, and that it dedicates real means of protection for natural resour-
ces and the living things that are affected by their production processes, etc. It
is necessary to place limits on the continual and systematic appropriation of
powers as attempted by the World Trade Organisation, which is not part of
the United Nations. This aspect clearly shows the conflict of rights and inte-
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159 In the Delphi technique, Ruiz Olabuénaga, J. e Ispizua, M. (1989) recommend between ten and thirty
participants. In the view of professor Landeta, J. (2002), for operational reasons the number should
not exceed fifty. Example of Delphi created by Luque, A.; Hernández Zubizarreta, J. & de Pablos, C.
(2016b).
rests between the two bodies. It is important to remember that in 2003, the
UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, a
body composed of independent experts, agreed to the establishment of
“Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Bu-
siness Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights” and the indemnification of
their contraventions. However, before this could be implemented, a lobby
from within the UN vetoed it, eventually forcing its disappearance by 2006.
Short of a revolution of citizens and scientists (which is asking a lot), the re-
gulation of TNCs is an almost impossible task, taking into account the po-
werful logic of the elections of supranational bodies (e.g. the EU), lobbies, and
all of the interests that back them.
15) The drafting of agreements against corruption—green, red and ye-
llow reference books, the Global Compact, etc., on ethics, CSR or good bu-
siness practice—without any of these contemplating the necessary resources
for the control of corruption, the establishment of precautionary, binding me-
thods, or powers of sanction and independent monitoring makes good fodder
for certain publishing houses and press conferences. Grants, subsidies and aid
for business schools and (supranational) governments, often wrapped in good
intentions, rather than being based on liability, do not invest resources nor de-
velop credible legislation for the eradication of corruption (see, for example,
the case of tax havens).
16) Being proportionate in the granting of aid funds and investments
from international bodies to those countries earnestly committed to the erra-
dication of the processes of corruption through the use of international ob-
servers or monitors. However, not through the use of private international bo-
dies with vested interests, as there are many with interested owners or
benefactors. Is a country which is open to signing free trade treaties less co-
rrupt than another with more equitable commercial mechanisms? In the view
of certain ratings agencies, the answer is yes, since this is one of the criteria
used by potential investors. A truly impartial list of the corruption and the ra-
tings given to countries for the purposes of investment should be established
by a body free of all vested interests, which also is able to indirectly punish
countries which oppose its position, believing there are other methods of ca-
rrying out their commercial activity.
17) The barring from office, from without the country concerned, of pu-
blic or private directors, governors or bodies that encourage (through their
actions or omissions) acts of corruption that seriously contravene the right to
life, including damage to the environment and the lands of indigenous peo-
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ple. In this point, it is worth recalling that such lands preserve natural and ge-
netic resources, and that the “free, prior and informed consent” of the inha-
bitants of these territories is required in order to prevent human rights in-
fringements. To achieve this, it is necessary to give powers to the International
Criminal Court (as well as the environmental prosecution service and the wor-
king practices inspectorate) with the purpose of engendering confidence, lar-
gely basing these on precepts of corporate criminal responsibility and world-
wide extraterritoriality from any locality, however small that be.
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